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The recent literature on unified growth theory has shed new light on the transition to sustained 
economic growth. Nevertheless, unified growth theory has not devoted a lot of attention to the 
nature of economic growth and its impact in the transition from Malthus to Solow. This research 
presents new evidence on the existence of pre-industrial growth spurts and provides new 
foundations concerning the nature of economic growth during the Malthus to Solow transition. 
Following previous research in unified growth theory, sustained economic growth arises due to 
complementarities between the triple engines of growth of technological development, human 
capital and the organization of the workplace. In this research, growth spurts are an intrinsic 
feature of the economy, but throughout history their effect on standards of living is mostly 
temporary. The rise in living standards only becomes sustained when the complementarity of the 
triple engines of growth emerges. In Malthusian economies, most technologies were basic and only 
require straightforward knowledge or human capital, and thus the skill-technology complementarity 
did not play a role in their development. As a consequence, most technological developments in 
Malthusian economies generated growth spurts that did not become sustained, although there was 
a temporary increase in standards of living. However, the increasing complexity of the epistemic 
knowledge base reported by the historical literature meant that investments in applied technology 
were progressively more significant, enhancing the role of human capital. After a certain threshold 
of the knowledge base was surpassed, more and more complex applied technologies were 
developed, and growth spurts became permanent features of the economy. This research thus 
captures some of the most important historical features concerning the nature of growth in the 
transition to sustained economic growth. 
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  11. Introduction 
One of the most recent and important developments in economic growth theory has been the 
research on the transition “from Malthus to Solow”, also known as unified growth theory (Galor 
2005). Although some attention had been previously devoted to the transition to sustained growth1, 
the new developments in unified growth theory not only enabled the integration of economic growth 
theory with the demographic transition, but also improved our understanding of the transition from 
Malthusian economies to modern economic growth2. 
Even so, unified growth theory has not yet devoted a lot of attention to the nature of 
economic growth and its impact in the transition from Malthusian times to sustained growth. 
Existing research typically assumes that growth was uneventful during the Malthusian epoch, and 
became only significant in the last 200 years. In contrast, the historical literature has often 
emphasized the existence of growth spurts or golden ages that lasted for a few decades. Thus, 
Jones (1988) states that economic growth is the norm and not the exception in human societies, 
recurring several times in pre-industrial economies. Cameron (1997) argues that rounds or waves 
of growth occurred throughout history, each wave building upon the preceding one. Clark (2001: 1) 
claims that “the Industrial Revolution was the last … of [the] growth spurts stretching back to the 
Middle Ages”. Similarly, Goldstone (2002: 333) argues that “efflorescences” or golden ages were 
prevalent in pre-industrial times, and thus he contends that: “We need to consider more complex 
dynamics than either a once-and-for-all shift from non-growth to growth, or economic growth as a 
gradual and universal process that occurs everywhere and always.” (Goldstone 2002: 327). The 
historical evidence also seems to suggest that there were several pre-industrial growth spurts both 
                                                 
1 Of which Kuznets (1966) is the most prominent illustration. As recent examples, see, for instance, Kremmer (199Q), 
or Goodfriend and McDermott (1995). 
2 Research on these areas include Galor (2005), Galor and Moav (2002), Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott 
(2002), Doepke (2004), Jones (2001), Lagerlöf (2006), Lucas (2002). 
  2in Europe and in Asia (e.g. in Sung China, Tokugawa Japan, 14th century Italy, 15th century 
Portugal, 16th century Spain, 17th century Holland, and 18th century Britain). Pereira (2003) 
presents empirical evidence on some of these growth spurts by looking at the relationship between 
real wages and population. The existence of these growth spurts suggests that growth did not 
emerge solely in the modern period (Jones 1988), although the nature of growth seems to have 
changed after the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr 1999). Even so, some questions remain: what made 
the growth spurts sustained? Why didn’t other growth spurts become sustained? Did the nature of 
growth really change in the transition to sustained economic growth? 
This paper tries to bridge the gap between the two literatures by presenting new empirical 
and historical evidence on the existence of pre-industrial growth spurts and provides new 
foundations concerning the nature of economic growth during transition to sustained growth. The 
paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most significant growth spurts in pre-
industrial economies and presents some empirical evidence on these growth episodes. Section 3 
introduces a model that summarizes the main features of the pre-industrial growth spurts. In this 
research, growth spurts are an intrinsic feature of pre-industrial economies, but their impact on 
living standards is temporary. The rise in living standards only becomes sustained when the 
complementarity of the triple engines of growth emerges. In Malthusian economies, technologies 
were basic and the skill-technology complementarity is not important. Hence, technological 
developments in Malthusian economies generate growth spurts that did not become sustained. 
However, the increasing complexity of the epistemic knowledge base increased the returns to 
investments in applied technology and enhanced the role of human capital. After a threshold of the 
knowledge base was surpassed, more and more complex applied technologies were developed, 
and growth spurts became permanent features of the economy. 
  32. Growth Spurts in Pre-Industrial Economies 
Galor and Weil’s (2000) canonical work on unified growth theory portrays the transition from 
to sustained growth as a three phase-framework through which economies evolve: Malthusian, 
post-Malthusian and modern. The main features of these economies are summarized in Figure 1. 
Income per capita is represented on the vertical axis, and population on the horizontal axis. The 
curve YL provides the different stages of development, whereas the vertical line A denotes the 
level of technology. The vertical dotted lines describe the different types of economies. To simplify, 
each level of technology is assumed to be independent of the standards of living and to depend 
solely on population. Suppose we start at point e1, which corresponds to a Malthusian economy. 
The level of technology is A1, income per capita is (Y/L)’ and the level of population is L1. Assume 
that there is an exogenous technological change (e.g. the development of the printing press) that 
increases the level of technology to A2. At the new equilibrium point e2 there is now a higher 
population (L2), but there is no change in the standards of living, which remain constant at (Y/L)’. 
Thus, in a Malthusian economy, changes in income (or technology) are only translated into higher 
populations and not into higher standards of living.  
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
In turn, in a Post-Malthusian, increases in income are translated into both higher population 
and higher standards of living, albeit the former effect was still dominant. Thus, an increase of the 
level of technology from, say, until A’’ to A’’’ takes the economy from e3 to e4, which originates an 
increase both in the level of population from L3 to L4 and in the living standards from (Y/L)2 to 
(Y/L)3. In addition, during the Post-Malthusian stage, we have ∆L > ∆(Y/L), since the population 
effect is stronger than the standards-of-living effect. Finally, in a modern economy the line YL 
  4becomes very steep, and increases in the level of technology are chiefly translated into higher 
standards of living. In a modern economy, a high level of technology increases the returns to 
human capital, and parents substitute child quality for quantity. Thus, an increase of level of 
technology increases the standards of living from (Y/L)4 to (Y/L)5, whereas population increases 
only from L5 to L6. Moreover, in a modern economy, the steepness of the YL curve implies that 
∆(Y/L) > ∆L, and hence the standards-of-living effects dominate the population effects.  
Besides these broad features of the transition from Malthus to Solow, the historical literature 
also emphasizes an important relationship between wages and population in pre-industrial 
economies. Figure 2 summarizes the main features of this relationship. In Malthusian economies, 
income gains are translated into more population and a bigger labor supply. Suppose we start at 
e1, with real wage (W/P)1, corresponding to the level of labor L1. After an income gain occurs, 
population grows and the labor supply shifts to L’s. As a consequence, the level of labor rises to L2, 
whereas real wages fall to (W/P)2. On the other hand, a contraction of the labor supply leads to an 
increase in real wages3.  
 
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
In contrast, in post-Malthusian and modern economies, sustained productivity gains shift the 
labor demand upwards, causing real wages to rise and offsetting the depressing effect on wages 
from higher population.  
The wage-population relationship can be observed for several European economies, for 
which there are good wage and population data. Most population data are from McEvedy and 
Jones (1978). Whenever possible, these data are complemented by other sources, such as 
                                                 
3 This is exactly what happened after the Black Death, when population fell by almost a quarter in many European 
regions, and living standards rose to levels that were not seen until the 1800s (Allen 2001). 
  5Hatcher (1977), Wrigley and Schofield (1981), de Vries and Woulde (1997), and de Vries (2000). In 
terms of wage data, for most countries there are not economy-wide real wage data. The wage data 
are for some representative professions (such as, laborers and craftsmen) that can proxy for the 
behavior of overall real wages. Most data on real wages are from Allen (2001). The Allen data are 
presented in grams of silver, a uniform measure that facilitates cross-country comparisons4. In 
countries for which there are sufficient data, the wage-population relationship is observed with the 
help of a non-parametric kernel-based method. By using local polynomial kernel regressions of real 
wages on population we can uncover structural features in the data that cannot be captured by a 
regular parametric framework. In this approach, observations are weighted taking into account a 
kernel function. Local polynomial kernel regressions fit WP (real wages), at each value of L 
(population), by choosing the parameters β to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors:  
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linear estimation function. The Epanechnikov kernel minimizes the asymptotic mean integrated 
squared errors, and hence it is optimal when compared to other kernels (Wand and Jones 1995). 







































L L t t        ( 2 )  
                                                 
4 The Allen data used are the following: Belgium (Antwerp: 1400-1900), England (London 1400-1900), Holland 
(Amsterdam: 1400 to 1900), Italy (Florence 1340-1900, and Milan 1600-1900), Spain (Madrid: 1550-1900, and 
Valencia:  1410 to 1790).  
  6Where I is an indicator function that is equal to one when the argument is equal or less than one 
and zero otherwise. For most countries, there is a strong inverse relationship between real wages 
and population until the 19th century. However, as previously argued, pre-industrial economies 
were by no means static. Several European economies underwent temporary growth spurts 
throughout the period. The rest of this section analyzes some of the most significant growth spurts 
in pre-industrial economies.  
Obviously, the examples below do not exhaust the episodes of known growth spurts, which 
include the great empires of the Asian and European Classical antiquity. On the contrary, they 
were chosen because they contain the main features of growth spurts in the pre-industrial period. 
We could, of course, simplify our approach and say that, according the Maddison (2001) data, in 
the 1,000 years before the Industrial Revolution economic growth consisted of cyclical (Malthusian) 
variations around an average growth rate of about 0.1 percent per year5. We could then pretty 
much ignore what happened in terms of growth during this period. However, we believe that by 
modeling and analyzing pre-industrial growth spurts, and by understanding why they failed to 
generate sustained growth, helps us explain why the spurt of the Industrial Revolution enabled us 
to achieve sustained growth. 
 
The European Frontier Movement 
Late medieval Europe provides the classical example of how Malthusian cycles occurred in 
pre-industrial economies, and it is thus the ideal starting point of our discussion. Between the 10th 
and the 14th centuries, Europe experienced a significant period of economic expansion and 
                                                 
5 As Grantham (1999: 10) puts it: “[Pre-industrial economies] advanced through alternating phases of expansion and 
contraction along a long-run productivity trend that probably did not exceed 0.1 percent per year. The low rate of 
growth is commonly … attributed to stagnant agricultural productivity, while the fluctuations are commonly attributed to 
demographic swings induced by frequent pandemics and lags in the response to fertility to changes in the standard 
produced by varying pressure of population on fixed supplies of land”. 
 
  7population growth. The period ended abruptly in the mid of the 14th century with the arrival of a 
major pestilence (the infamous Black Death), as well as endemic wars and famines. In this period, 
growth was due to both gains from trade and technical change. Trade expanded considerably 
under substantial population growth and urbanization. There were also several new inventions and 
the adoption of more efficient systems of agricultural production (such as the three-field system). 
This was an epoch in which Europe imported and adapted several technologies from others, such 
as Islam, Asia and the classical Antiquity. The most important technologies of this period include 
windmills, more efficient waterwheels, dams, the nailed horseshoe, the stirrup, the modern horse 
collar, better boats (e.g. the cog), soap, butter, strong distilled liquors, skis, wheelbarrows, paper, 
the lateen, and improved window glass (Mokyr 1990). Population growth fueled by land 
intensification and the adoption of more efficient modes of production enabled the start of a 
virtuous circle of development and growth, which fomented the growth of cities and the expansion 
of trade. At the start of the period, there were very few cities, and population was mainly scattered 
in small villages. Population growth fueled urbanization and commerce. By the 13th century, most 
towns were still small, although there were also some bigger cities6. National and international 
trade also grew tremendously, and fairs and markets appeared throughout Europe. By the 13th 
century, the economic and population expansion started to reach its limits, causing rents and 
prices to rise significantly. The downturn of the Malthusian cycle occurred in the mid 14th century 
with the arrival of several wars, famines and pestilences. Population fell by more than 25 percent in 
many regions, and, consequently, real wages rose dramatically in the following decades until 
population started to recover. All in all, the growth spurt in medieval Europe was made possible by 
increasing trade as well as improvements in the agricultural sector.  
 
                                                 
6 Milan and Venice had around 200,000 inhabitants, Paris 100,000, Ghent and Bruges 50,000, and London 30,000.  
  8Italian Renaissance 
In the late Middle ages, the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa specialized in long-distance 
trade in the Mediterranean sea, and became transit ports of Asia and Arab goods destined to 
Western Europe. During this period, Florence also became a leading manufacturing center and the 
biggest financial center in Western Europe (Pounds 1974: 465). These and other Italian cities 
flourished under a combination of factors that include international trade and institutional 
developments that fueled productivity improvements in the commercial sector. The Italians 
developed several important commercial innovations that decreased transaction costs and greatly 
stimulated trade (North and Thomas 1973). The most important innovations included the founding 
of trading companies or partnerships, the development of insurance in long-distance trade, double-
entry bookkeeping, the bill of exchange, the commenda, and banking (Crouzet 2001: 41-43), 
causing a so-called commercial revolution (Pounds 1974). Several of these innovations were 
designed to improve the establishment of property rights, which improved efficiency and enhanced 
productivity. As a consequence, trade flourished, population expanded, and urbanization 
accelerated. Figure 3 shows that for most of the 15th century the wage-population inverse 
relationship was temporarily disrupted, as wages increased at the same time as population. 
 
< Figure 3 about here > 
 
The Italian Golden Age came to an end due to increasing competition from commercial 
rivals, and from the participation of the Italian cities in several conflicts. The first blow to their quasi 
monopoly occurred after the wars with the Ottoman Empire in the late 15th century, which ended 
the commercial supremacy of the Italians in the Levant. Italian-based trade suffered another major 
setback with the discovery of the competing sea route to India by the Portuguese in the early 
  91500s, which led to a substantial decrease in the commerce of spices in the ports of the Levant. 
Finally, the occupation of the Spice Islands by the Dutch in 1605 de facto ended Venice’s and 
Genoa’s spice trades.  
In sum, international trade, institutional developments in commercial-related activities and 
some manufacturing were the main causes for the Italian golden age. The end of this growth spurt 
occurred because the gains from trade were increasingly exhausted by increasing competition from 
rivals, as well as due to losses related to wars and the decline of the growth-promoting sectors, 
such as banking (in Florence) and manufacturing. The amounting losses in long-distance trading 
stimulated a redirection of trade-related profits and, by the end of the growth spurt, Italian traders 
increasingly invested in landed estates instead of new commercial adventures (Pounds 1974: 470). 
After the growth spurt was over, the Italian cities entered a long period of general stagnation.
 
The Iberian Miracle 
In the 15th and 16th centuries, stimulated by their famous global geographical endeavors, the 
Iberian economies had their own golden ages, during which population and living standards 
expanded simultaneously. The Portuguese expansion was fueled from the trade-related gains from 
the exploitation of coastal Africa, the discovery of the sea route to India, the establishment of 
trading posts Asia, and the exploitation of Brazil. By becoming the first global empire (Russell-
Wood 1992), the Portuguese were able to diversify the portfolio of exported goods and resources 
as well as to dramatically increase the size of markets. During this period, there were several 
trade- and navigation-related technical inventions, including the caravel (a cargo ship that sailed 
faster than its previous counterparts in Western Europe), the utilization of the astrolabe and 
important improvements in map-making. The profits from the large inflows of gold from East Africa, 
slaves, the spice trade and several Brazilian agricultural goods gave an unprecedented affluence 
  10to this small European country. Although there are no reliable and consistent data for the period, 
there are several reports that suggest a substantial increase in living standards (especially in 
Lisbon) and a considerable population increase (Braudel 1982, Russell-Wood 1992). 
Similarly, in Spain, the revenues from the empire and the gains from international trade 
enabled real wages to grow at the same time as population during the early 16th century (Figure 4). 
The discovery and exploitation of the Americas led to substantial trade-related gains, especially in 
terms of natural resources and South American bullion. Spain built the biggest global empire the 
world had ever seen, and the commercial sector benefited accordingly. 
 
< Figure 4 about here > 
 
Wage data for Valencia craftsmen and laborers also show that the Spanish growth spurt was 
experienced in other regions outside Madrid (Pereira 2003). Nevertheless, after 1630, the 
relationship between real wages and population became once again negative until early in the 19th 
century. A long period of stagnation and decline followed. All in all, trade-fueled growth spurts 
enabled the Iberian economies to temporarily experience simultaneous increases in real wages 
and population. However, after the growth spurt ended, real wages and population reverted to their 
previous inverse relationship. 
 
The Dutch Golden Age   
Between around 1550 and 1650, the Netherlands had its own golden age, during which GDP 
per capita, real wages and population all increased increased, suggesting that the population gains 
were no longer diluting the standards-of-living gains. Thus, in their path-breaking work on the 
Dutch economy, de Vries and Woude (1997) assert that the Dutch economy started to exhibit 
some signs of “modernity” during this period, since the Malthusian negative relationship between 
  11living standards and population was no longer present. This Golden Age was chiefly caused by 
commercial expansion. By using and improving many of the commercial-related innovations of the 
Italians, the Dutch were able to  
However, these signs of modernity were only temporary. After 1650, population growth 
stagnated, and GDP per capita fell. Consequently, the Kernel fit polynomial relating both variables 
becomes negatively sloped (figure 5a). Only after 1800 did both population and GDP per capita 
increase simultaneously once again. The wage data also confirm these findings (figure 5b). During 
this period, there were simultaneous increases in population and real wages (for craftsmen and 
laborers). After the 17th century, the Dutch economy entered an extended period of stagnation. The 
Golden Age allowed the Dutch economy to temporarily escape the traditional negative relationship 
between real wages and population. Nevertheless, after this growth spurt ended, the inverse 
relationship between wages and population emerged once again, persisting until the 19th century.  
 
< Figure 5 about here > 
 
Although this Golden Age took the Dutch economy to a higher equilibrium level than its 
European counterparts, and in spite of unprecedented urbanization rates and of considerable 
structural change, the Dutch growth spurt was once again mostly related to the development of 
trade rather than to substantial improvements in the knowledge base of techniques. As Mokyr 
(2000: 12) emphasizes: “[The] advanced technology that helped propel the Dutch economy into 
unprecedented … riches in the 17th and 18th centuries was still mostly the traditional, pragmatic 
knowledge at the level of artisans or applied engineers: mechanically clever, well-designed 
techniques, but without much of an epistemic base in the deeper natural phenomena that made 
them work. As a consequence, technological progress ran into diminishing returns.”  
  12Growth Spurts in China7
Growth spurts were not restricted to Europe. Although traditionally pictured as a dormant 
giant, for a long time the Chinese economy was not only one of the most dynamic in the world, but 
also the source of many of the most important inventions. Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
Chinese economy underwent several pre-industrial growth spurts, of which the most important 
occurred in the Sung (960-1279 AD) and the Qing (especially between 1680 and 1780) periods. 
During the Sung period, agriculture was boosted by a series of factors that boosted productivity. 
There was an elimination of the conscription of labor, an innovative tax reform allowed farmers to 
use money rather than grain to pay their duties, and several agricultural innovations were 
introduced. As a result, per capita incomes seem to have increased although population expanded 
rapidly (Jones 1988). In turn, population growth promoted urban growth, creating the biggest cities 
in the world. Human capital accumulation was enhanced by the introduction of a national school 
system, which aimed to attract the brightest minds to the service of the emperor and the state. In 
addition, an important innovation of the Sung period was the introduction of money and the 
development of credit, both of which stimulated trade, both nationally and internationally. Technical 
innovation also carried out in many areas of the economy8. Nevertheless, the Sung golden age 
petered out for internal and external reasons. Hartwell (1966) argues that the end of the Sung was 
caused chiefly because of the Jurchen and Mongol invasions. In contrast, more recent 
historiography points out the exhaustion of trade opportunities and the agrarization of Chinese 
society as the main causes of the decrease in creativity and dynamism of the economy.  
                                                 
7 The final version of this paper will also include a small subsection on the Japanese Tokugawa growth spurt. 
8 For centuries, China was the main source of many of the world’s greatest inventions, including irrigation and fertilizing 
techniques, seed drills, the deep-tooth harrow, the iron plow, the use of blast furnaces, the spinning wheel, 
sophisticated water clocks, the compass, paper, paper money, porcelain, explosives, gunpowder, copper sulphates, 
pharmaceuticals, the wheelbarrow, the horsecollar, the umbrella, the toothbrush (Mokyr 1990). 
  13A later growth spurt took place during the Qing period. The Qing settled in new territories (in 
Mongolia and central Asia), colonized new lands, introduced New World crops, and restored free 
peasantry. Trade and markets expanded considerably and education was promoted9. As a result of 
all these changes, population increased at a dramatic rate, more than doubling in the 18th century. 
However, and although there are no good data for the period, according to some reports, initially, 
the rise in population was also accompanied by a small increase in living standards. Namely, 
according to some reports, the introduction of new crops and some agricultural innovations let to a 
rise in per capita consumption of foodstuff, as well as cotton and silk products (Pomeranz 2000). 
Still, by mid-18th century, the Qing expansion started to run into several constraints and began to 
“[sink] into ecological, administrative, and economic growth downspins due to its inability to cope 
with ongoing massive population growth” (Goldstone 2002: 353). Under the heavy administrative 
building of the Qing, corruption became pervasive and the tensions and conflicts with the Western 
powers put even more strain into the empire. By early 20th century, the pressures became 
insurmountable and the Chinese imperial system crumbled down under the revolution of 1911. 
 
18th century Britain 
From about 1620 until around 1740, the English economy experienced a growth spurt, 
enabling population and real wages to both trend upwards. North and Thomas (1973) attribute 
much of the significant income gains during this period to the establishment of well-defined 
property rights as well as gains from international trade. However, this growth spurt did not become 
self-sustaining, since by 1720 real wages declined whereas population continued to increase. This 
trend persisted until the start of the Industrial Revolution.  
 
< Figure 6 about here > 
                                                 
9 Rawski (1979) argues that non-elite literacy was fundamental for the many administrative regulations of the Qing 
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Revolution marks a departure from Malthusian times, since after this period the relationship 
between real wages and population became permanently positive, heralding the arrival of 
sustained economic growth. The most important innovations of the early industrial period were the 
puddling and rolling technique, the use of coke, the water frame, the spinning jenny, Crompton’s 
mule, the power loom, the cotton gin, the carding machine, chlorine bleaching, the emergence of a 
small machine-tool making industry, the steam engine, improvements in waterpower efficiency, gas 
lighting, food canning, and hot-air ballooning (Mokyr 1990). Many of these new technologies 
increased the rewards for entrepreneurs to invest in more centralized modes of production, such as 
the factory system. After this period, there was a fundamental complementarity between these two 
engines of growth that fueled industrial development.   
 
Taking Stock: Growth Spurts, the Industrial Revolution and the Triple Engines of Growth 
The historical evidence shows that, as Jones (2003: 40) puts it: “Instead of thinking of growth 
as an aberration, [we should] try thinking it as the norm”. In general, the sources of these growth 
spurts were either trade-related, resource abundance or the expansion of markets. All pre-
industrial growths were temporary and failed to generate sustained economic growth10. In all these 
growth spurts, there were two main motives why growth did not become sustained: political 
economy factors (wars, vested interests, etc.), the diminishing returns associated with trade and/or 
low level of the skill-technology complementarity.  
A crucial difference between the pre-industrial golden ages and the Industrial Revolution is 
that the last growth spurt became permanent. The recent unified growth theory emphasizes that a 
                                                 
10 As Goldstone  (2002: 341) puts it: “What all [pre-industrial growth spurts] failed to do, however, was to sustain a 
sharply rising level of per capita income past two or three generations of population growth. Thereafter, innovation 
ceases or provides diminishing returns as vested interested and conservative states or churches halt the pace of 
change in knowledge and technology” 
  15crucial different between Malthusian and modern economies is the skill-technology 
complementarity (Galor and Weil 2000). Similarly, Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts (2002) assert that 
human capital and technological change are twin engines of growth. According to them, skills and 
technology are static complements in production and dynamic complements in the growth process. 
Since the complementarity in production is bounded, Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts show that human 
capital and technology are equal partners in economic development, and hence sustainable 
economic growth cannot be generated without one of them. 
The importance of the skill-technology complementarity seems to be corroborated by the 
existing historical evidence. In terms of human capital, after the Renaissance and the Reformation, 
literacy rates dramatically increased throughout Western Europe. Between 1500 and 1800, literacy 
rates increased more than 4 times in the most advanced European countries. Second, the quality 
of European human capital was further enriched by the development of the scientific method and 
culture (figure 7), as well as by the diffusion of the printing press. The rise in literacy combined with 
the science-induced improvement in human capital quality became crucial contributors to the rise 
of Western Europe. Other countries that had similar levels of development to Western Europe 
around 1500 (e.g. China) not only failed to develop the scientific culture and method that 
Newtonian mechanics propagated around the European continent (Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 
2005), but also had much lower literacy rates than their European counterparts.  
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
By the 18th century Western Europe had also developed more efficient technology than other 
regions of the globe. Although in previous periods China had a noticeable technological 
supremacy, at the outset of the Industrial Revolution Europe was substantially more advanced in 
terms of technology and mechanization. Finally, by the 18th century Western Europe had also 
  16undertaken several crucial organizational changes. Institutional and political improvements were 
instrumental to break down the elements of technological inertia of the most dynamic European 
societies. However, per se institutions were not sufficient for industrialization11. Finally, Europeans 
were the first to solve the considerable organizational uncertainties associated with the 
development of a new organizational General Purpose Technology, the factory system.  
In sum, the origins of modern economic growth were greatly associated with the 
development of triple engines of growth, consisting of human capital, technology and 
organizational change. The triple engines of growth formed a symbiosis that enabled some 
countries to achieve sustainable growth earlier than others. All the engines of growth were strongly 
complementary to each other.  
 
3. Modeling Growth Spurts 
Modelling growth spurts in the context of growth theory is not novel. In a recent paper, 
Voigyländer and Voth (2005) develop a model in which exogenous positive agricultural shocks 
have the potential to bring about an Industrial Revolution. Similarly, Lagerlöf  (2005) provides 
reasonable numerical parameters to the Galor-Weil (2000) model and finds that the time paths for 
population and the remaining variables display oscillatory behavior, that is, they generate 
endogenous cycles. 
To model growth spurts and the transition to sustained growth, we use a standard 
overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility (Galor and Weil 2000, Galor 2005). In our 
research, growth spurts are an intrinsic feature of the economy, but throughout history their effect 
                                                 
11 For instance, the Netherlands had some of the most developed institutions and well-defined property rights, but it 
failed to industrialize earlier than others such as Britain, Belgium or the Switzerland (Mokyr 1999). The Netherlands 
achieved an advanced state of development in the 18th century (de Vries and des Woulde 1997), but by mid 18th 
century there was already some reversal in standards of living and in the rates of urbanization. Thus, the Dutch growth 
spurt was not followed by sustained rates of economic growth, and development temporarily petered out. 
  17on standards of living is mostly temporary. The rise in living standards only becomes sustained 
when the complementarity of the triple engines of growth emerges. In Malthusian economies, most 
technologies are basic and only require straightforward knowledge or human capital, and thus the 
skill-technology complementarity do not play a role in their development. As a consequence, most 
technological developments in Malthusian economies generate growth spurts that do not become 
sustained, although there is a temporary increase in standards of living. In these growth spurts, 
there is capital accumulation and temporarily higher living standards, but no sustained productivity 
improvements.  
In opposition to the Malthusian era, the increasing complexity of the epistemic knowledge 
base (Mokyr 2002) implies that investments in applied technology become progressively more 
significant, enhancing the role of human capital. After a certain threshold of the knowledge base is 
surpassed, more and more complex applied technologies are developed, and growth spurts 
became permanent features of the economy. 
In terms of fertility decisions, the difference from previous work is that, in our model 
whenever there are temporary growth spurts, income effects in fertility decisions dominate and the 
demographic transition does not take place. In contrast, when growth spurts become permanent 
after the Industrial Revolution, parents start substituting child quality for child quantity, and 
substitution effects starts to dominate the income effect. Consequently, after the early stages of the 
growth spurt is over, the demographic transition enters into full swing, and birth rates decline. 
All in all, our model replicates the most important features of pre-industrial growth spurts and 
the start of sustained growth. The paper adds to the existing unified growth literature by providing 
empirical evidence on pre-industrial growth spurts and by explicitly modeling the changes on the 
nature of growth during the transition from Malthus to Solow 
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  20Figure 1: From a Malthus to Solow: The Three Phases in the Galor-Weil Model 
 
 
  21Figure 2 _ Wages Vs. Population from Malthus to Solow 
 
 
  22Figure 3 _ Florence Craftsmen Real Wages vs. Population (1330-1700) 
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Figure 4 _ Madrid Craftsmen Real Wages vs. Population (1550-1900) 
 
 








  25Figure 6 _ London Craftsmen Real Wages vs. Population (1300-1900) 
 
 
  26Fig. 7a_ Patents in England, 1660-1851 
   
 
Source: Dutton (1984) and McLeod (1988) 
  
Fig. 7b_ Scientific Discoveries in Europe, 1621-1900 
 
Source: Rainoff (1929) 













Austria 6  21   Eastern Europe  1  4 
Belgium   10  49   Russia 1  4 
France 7  37   USA -  50 
Germany 6  35   UK 10  52 
Italy 12  22   China 7  18 
Netherlands 10  68   India 2  3 
Sweden 10  85   Japan 7  27 
Portugal 1  10   Other Asia  3  3 
Spain 1  20   Africa 0  2 
 
Source: European data are from Cipolla (1969), Cressy (1980), and Stone (1954). China's figures are from 
Rawski (1979), Japan's from Dore (1965) and Passin (1965), USA’s were extrapolated from Lockridge 
(1965), India’s from Parulekar (1957), and Africa’s were extrapolated from Maddison (2001) 
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